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can really learn from Cliﬀord Geertz
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Department of Public Administration at the Institute for Management Research, Radboud University,
Nijmegen, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Interpretive researchers, also in our ﬁeld, often refer to Geertz’
work. They focus on taking the natives’ point of view, thick
description and reading culture as a text. In this paper, it is argued
that these guidelines cannot provide good reason to accept one
interpretation of a social phenomenon over any other interpreta-
tion. On closer inspection, however, Geertz’ work displays a stron-
ger approach. This approach on important points ﬁts Lakatos’ ideal
of sophisticated falsiﬁcationism. This reexamination of Geertz’
actual approach urges to reconsider the strict dichotomy that is
often made between interpretive and other types of research in
Public Administration and Political Science.
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Introduction
Interpretative studies in the ﬁeld of Public Administration and Political Science remarkably
often refer to work by Cliﬀord Geertz. His most cited text is Deep Play. Notes on the Balinese
Cockﬁght (Geertz 1973a). Two other essays to which many references can be found are Thick
Description (Geertz 1973b) and From the Natives’ Point of View (Geertz 1983). Some scholars
refer to these texts in a general way for their inspirational approach (e.g. Rhodes 2011, 202,
208; Schwartz-Shea andYanow2012, vii; Stivers 2008, 1011; Thompson 2001; Yanow2006, 5).
In course books and overviews, these texts are often presented as classics (e.g. Brower,
Abolaﬁa, and Carr 2000; Dodge, Ospina, and Foldy 2005; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012,
49; Wagenaar 2011, 18; White 1999, 37, 49, Yanow 2000, 7, 40). They are also routinely
mentioned in research articles (e.g. Aagaard 2012, 735; Fleming 2008, 622; Geddes 2012, 950;
VanHulst 2012, 302;White 1999, 111). It is not diﬃcult to grasp the attraction ofGeertz’ texts,
especially that ofDeepPlay. This text tells the fascinating story of two researcherswho arrive in
a Bali village [‘malarial and diﬃdent’ (Geertz 1973a, 413)] to study local customs. They get
caught up in a police raidwhile attending an illegal cockﬁght (a circumstance that helped them
gain the villagers’ trust).Deep Play also presents a colorful picture of Balinese practices (e.g. of
men toddling cocks, of cockﬁghts and the associated gambling) and oﬀers an encompassing
interpretation of these cultural phenomena, suggesting that cockﬁghts are fundamentally a
dramatization of status concerns (Geertz 1973a, 437). Thus, his work is a combination
between literature and a research report. With humor and some suspense, Geertz moves in
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a clear style from description and interpretation to theoretical reﬂection on doing interpre-
tative research. He teaches and, at the same time, practices the idea that research should be
focused on themeanings that actions have for people, not on pointing out causalmechanisms.
He writes that such understandings must be presented in ‘thick descriptions’ of ‘webs of
meaning’ and that culture should be read as a text.
The scholars that refer to Geertz tend to use him as an example of a particular way of
doing research. This interpretive approach oﬀers an alternative to causal explanatory,
data-focused, measuring and falsiﬁcationist types of study (for such categorizations,
often in the form of dichotomies, see Brower, Abolaﬁa, and Carr 2000; Raadschelders
2013; Ricucci 2010; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 113; Yanow 2000, vii).
Given the exemplary status that is given to Geertz, the interesting question is
whether his interpretation of the meaning of Balinese Cockﬁghts in Deep Play is true,
and if so, why is this the case?1 What, according to Geertz, makes an interpretation a
good interpretation? Some commentators claim that Geertz, in fact, does not oﬀer
many useful criteria to determine whether an interpretation is good. According to
Geertz, ‘a good interpretation of anything – a poem, a person, a history, a ritual, an
institution, a society – takes us into the heart of that of which it is the interpretation’
(1973b, 18). He also claims ‘a study is an advance if it is more incisive than those that
preceded it’ (1973b, 25). A good interpretation brings us ‘in touch with lives of
strangers’ (1973b, 16). These are very vague criteria, as Geertz himself acknowledges
(Jones 1998, 39; Martin 1993, 278; Shankman 1984, 263). That also seems to hold for
his most-cited advice about interpretative research: that we should try to understand
people ‘as they understand themselves’ and that we should use thick description to
confer their meanings. According to critics, such as Jones, ‘Geertz’ interpretive analysis
of the Balinese cockﬁght is fascinating and ingenious. It makes marvelous reading. It is
also entirely arbitrary’ (Jones 1998, 45). If Jones is right, scholars who follow Geertz’
example seem to be in serious trouble. Their interpretation of the meaning of actions of
politicians, civil servants or other actor might not be better than any other interpreta-
tion (see Zwart 2002). Are the critics right, or are there convincing criteria for
distinguishing between better and worse interpretations to be found in Deep Play?
In this paper, I want to show that Geertz’ approach in Deep Play can indeed be
exemplary for interpretive studies in the social sciences. However, the true epistemolo-
gical strength of his approach lies in a diﬀerent aspect than what is most often cited. The
most important part of his approach is not ‘taking the natives’ point of view’, presenting a
thick description, or reading culture as a text. Instead, the most crucial part of his
approach is the way in which Geertz shows that his interpretation can do what another
interpretation cannot. His approach proves to be much closer to the one that is mostly
associated with the opposite camp: positivist falsiﬁcationism. This insight urges us to
revise the often-presented dichotomies between interpretative approaches (qualitative,
meaning and making sense) and positivist (quantitative, causal explanation and testing)
approaches.
Geertz’ Deep Play has been the subject of eﬀorts of unmasking or deconstruction, a
fate of every classical text. Some have noted the rhetoric skill that Geertz employed in
this text to present his conclusions as evident (Watson 1989, 29; compare Warnke
2011). Others have focused on his unsubstantiated claims concerning Balinese senti-
ments and orientations, claims that seem to express sexist, western and colonialist
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prejudices (Crapanzo 1986; Lichterman 2011; Roseberry 1982). My intention, how-
ever, is not deconstruction or even to challenge the work of Geertz. The intention of
this paper is instead to better understand his approach to show wherein his true
example lies.
In the Participating observation and thick description section, the items in Deep Play
that are often cited as exemplary will be examined, and it will be shown that neither
oﬀers a convincing criterion for judging which interpretation is best. In the Comparing
interpretations section, a closer inspection of Geertz’ actual argument in Deep Play will
bring about a more convincing way of judging the epistemological status of an inter-
pretation. In the last section, implications of this analysis for research in Public
Administration and Political Science will be discussed.
Participating observation and thick description
Three aspects of Deep Play are most often cited as exemplary for interpretive research
in the social sciences:
● trying to understand people as they understand themselves;
● oﬀering understandings by presenting thick descriptions and
● using text-analysis as the paradigm for studying societal meanings.
(see, for example, Aagaard, 2012, 735; Brower, Abolaﬁa, and Carr 2000; Dodge, Ospina, and
Foldy 2005; Fleming 2008, 622; Flyvbjerg 2001, 133, 138; Geddes 2012, 950; VanHulst 2012,
302; Thompson 2001; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 49;Wagenaar 2011, 18;White 1999;
Yanow 2000, 7, 40).
In this section, I will take a closer look at each of these factors and consider whether
and to what extent they provide criteria for determining the quality of an interpretation.
Understanding people as they understand themselves
Deep Play opens with a fascinating narrative of Geertz and his wife, both anthropologists,
arriving in a small Balinese village in the late 1950s. Although they were oﬃcially
accredited by the Indonesian government and accommodated by the village chief, the
villagers treated them as if they were not there, as if they were nonpersons. After 10 days,
however, they visited a local cockﬁght and their status abruptly changed. Cockﬁghts are
illegal in Bali. One day, while attending a cockﬁght, Geertz and his wife ﬁnd themselves,
during the third match, in the middle of a police raid. As the villagers started to run in
all directions, they decided to do the same, and they took shelter with other villagers in
one of the compounds. When the police later wanted to question those present, Geertz
and his wife joined in on acting innocent. After this incident, the villagers completely
changed their attitude toward the researchers. They no longer treated them as outsiders,
and the whole village opened up to them. This represented a turning point in their
relationship with the community. ‘[W]e were quite literary “in”’ (1973a, 416). Geertz
continues his story by explaining how important this entrance into the community was
for his research. It enabled the anthropologist to get ‘the kind of immediate, inside view
graspʼ of the mentality of the people he was studying (1973a, 416). He expresses this
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‘necessity of anthropological ﬁeldworkʼ (1973a, 416) time and again, in diﬀerent word-
ings: ‘One has to learn how to get access to [societies and lives that] contain their own
interpretationsʼ (1973a, 453). One needs to determine ‘[h]ow to get in touch with the
lives of strangersʼ (1973b, 16). That means crossing ‘somehow, some moral or metaphy-
sical shadow lineʼ (1973a, 413). If you succeed, you can ‘read over their shoulderʼ and
have ‘a revelation of what being a Balinese “is really like”’ (1973a, 452, 417). Of course,
getting almost caught in a vice raid was helpful for Geertz and can hardly be presented as
general methodological advice. Yet, the gist is clear, one has to become, in whatever way
possible, an insider.
It should be the researcher’s ambition, according to Geertz, to get in and then to
grasp the native’s point of view. He should try to understand how they understand
themselves. His own study of cockﬁghts reports ‘a Balinese reading of Balinese experi-
ence. A story they tell themselves about themselves’ (1973a, 448). ‘Societies (. . .) contain
their own interpretations’ (453). ‘The Balinese peasants are quite aware of all this [what
cockﬁghts are all about] and can, at least to an ethnographer, do state most of it in
approximately the same terms as I have’ (440, see also 433: ‘for the Balinese, though
naturally they do not formulate it in so many words’).
‘Getting in’ as a criterion for interpretation?
Geertz uses a story to explain the value of ‘getting in’. Neither in Deep Play nor in his
other essays does he oﬀer much of a method for anthropological ﬁeldwork. It seems
safe, however, to understand him as an advocate of long-term residence among the
people one studies, participating in observation and being versed in the local language
and idiom (Gottowik 2004, 158). One issue is, of course, whether one, as a researcher,
can truly understand the natives’ point of view. In a later essay, Geertz explained that
taking the natives’ point of view has its limits. A researcher can and must try to
understand (‘verstehen’) what actions, such as cockﬁghts, mean to the people he or
she studies. That does not mean, however, that he or she must, or even can, appreciate
(‘einfühlen’) these actions in the way the subjects do (1983, 13). To understand the
natives’ point of view, one thus does not (completely) need to go native.
Yet, even given this distinction between understanding and appreciation, it is still
problematic to present the understanding that people have of themselves. The point is
illustrated by the interpretation Geertz himself gives of Balinese cockﬁghts in Deep Play.
He tells us that these cockﬁghts are ‘fundamentally a dramatization of status concerns’
(1973a, 437). This, of course, can hardly be the language and idiom of Balinese
villagers.2 In fact, this is acknowledged by Geertz: ‘for the Balinese, though naturally
they do not formulate it in so many words’; ‘the Balinese peasants are quite aware of all
this and can, at least to an ethnographer, do state most of it in approximately the same
terms as I have.’ (1973a, 433, 440; the emphasis is mine). In another essay, he maintains
that ‘anthropological writings are themselves interpretations, and second and third ones
to boot’ (as they are based on ‘our own interpretations of what our informants are up to
or think they are up to’) (1973b, 15). They are ‘our own constructions of other people’s
constructions of what they and their compatriots are up toʼ (1973b, 9). Here, Geertz
concedes that the interpretation of a researcher is inevitably his interpretation. There is
a logical distinction between the subject’s and the researcher’s understanding. This need
not be a fatal ﬂaw for interpretive research. Yet, it is a problem for those who would like
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to maintain that a good (or true or best) interpretation is the one that oﬀers the best
self-understanding of the subjects under study (compare on this point the work of
Warnke 2011, 48). Whatever following the rules anthropological ﬁeldwork can accom-
plish, it cannot lead to ‘the natives’ point of view’ and therefore cannot be a criterion for
the truth or quality of an interpretation.3
Thick description
After the presentation, in Deep Play, of his entrance into the Balinese community,
Geertz turns to the phenomenon of cockﬁghts. He shows that cocks and cockﬁghting
have a manifest role in Balinese language and folktales. He provides colorful sketches of
the ways in which, in popular understanding, cocks and their behavior are linked to
manhood. He describes the activities and worries of owners and trainers of cocks
between the ﬁghts and explains how cocks are prepared for ﬁghts. He also gives us a
lively picture of the cockﬁght itself: the rules, the roles of the oﬃcials, the spectators, the
complicated betting system (including center bets between cock owners and side bets
between spectators) and, of course, the ﬁghts between the cocks. Sharp spurs are ﬁxed
to the cock’s legs, making the ﬁghts bloody and often lethal.
Geertz presents us not with data but with what he calls, after Ryle, a thick description
(1973b, 6). For Geertz, oﬀering an understanding of what a cockﬁght is about is
diﬀerent from saying that it comes down to ‘a chicken hacking another mindless to
bits’ (1973a, 449). To make the meaning of human activities understandable, one must
do more than describe basic characteristics. It is only by a thick description that one can
distinguish the (meaningful) wink from a mere twitch of the eye (1973b, 7). To bring
the meaning of actions to the level of understanding, the researcher must show the
intentions, expectations, circumstances, settings and purposes involved (Greenblatt
1999, 16). Geertz, with approval, cites Weber, saying ‘that man is an animal suspended
in webs of signiﬁcance he himself has spun’ (1973b, 5). Showing what someone means
by something demands making the many threads of the web of meaning visible.
Thick description as a criterion for interpretation?
Thin description, for Geertz, means presenting an act without providing it with any
meaning. A ‘thin description’ consists of only meaningless data – to the extreme: a set
of ﬁgures. A thick description, on the other hand, provides us with more than a
minimal external depiction of an action. Yet, when is one thick description better
than another one? Put diﬀerently, when does a thick description make for a better
interpretation of the meaning of an action? Is a longer description, a more detailed
description, a description that encompasses more levels of meaning or a description
that is more complex, in that it includes more social activities, better? And, which of
two diﬀerent interpretations should we prefer if they contain the same level of detail,
complexity and the like? Or, again, when have we included all relevant aspects in our
thick description, when is it complete? Geertz does not give us answers to such
questions, nor are such answers evident. He might be quite right, as Ryle’s example
of the twitch and the wink shows, that the researcher who wants to convey meaning
should not limit himself to a thin description of a phenomenon. That in itself, however,
does not provide us with the necessary criteria to pick the better (thick) interpretation
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of what that phenomenon means (compare Jones 1998; Martin 1993; Roseberry 1982;
Shankman 1984).
Reading culture like a text
The researcher must try to grasp the meaning of actions of the subjects, and to do so,
must ‘read over their shoulders’, as Geertz expresses it at one point (1973a, 452). This
‘reading’ is a telling expression: in the last part of Deep Play, Geertz explains that
analyzing cultural forms should be understood as ‘parallel with penetrating a literary
text’ (1973a, 448). Anthropology should not follow the example of the sciences (‘dis-
secting an organism, diagnosing a symptom, deciphering a code, or ordering a system’,
idem). It should not dwell on ‘social mechanics’ but should instead concentrate on
‘social semantics’. The proper example is textual analysis. This means that cultural
forms, according to Geertz, should be treated as texts (Geertz 1973a, 449). ‘Doing
ethnography’, he maintains in another essay, ‘is like trying to read (. . .) a manuscript
– foreign, faded, full of ellipses, incoherencies, suspicious emendations, and tendentious
commentaries, but written not in conventionalized graphs of sound but in transient
examples of shaped behavior’ (1973b, 10).
Geertz places his approach in a tradition that also includes the work of Ricoeur,
Spinoza, Nietzsche and others: ‘all oﬀer precedents, if not equally recommendable ones’
(1973a, 448n36, 449). Elsewhere, he draws on Dilthey and his notion of the hermeneutic
circle to understand texts: ‘a continuous dialectical tacking between the most local of
local detail and the most global of global structure in such a way as to bring them into
simultaneous view’ (1983, 69). In line with this idea of hopping back and forth between
the whole and the parts seems to be his claim that an ethnographer should not try to
‘capture primitive facts in faraway places’ but that he should try ‘to reduce puzzlement’
on the way men live there (1973b, 16).
Textual analysis as a criterion?
Geertz notes a clear parallel between social analysis as an understanding of meaning
and textual analy sis: both are concerned with oﬀering an interpretation of meaning
instead of a causal explanation. Yet, what makes a textual analysis an analogy for a
better interpretation? Geertz is very brief on this issue. His suggestions include follow-
ing a particular procedure (hermeneutic circle), a criterion of coherence (following
from the manuscript-analogy and the hermeneutic circle), and the notion of reducing
puzzlement.
The procedure for reaching an understanding of a text by going back and forth
between the parts and the whole, however, does not provide much of a criterion for
distinguishing between better and worse interpretations. In Deep Play, Geertz does not
provide his readers with a report of his process of going back and forth in trying ever
new (modiﬁed) interpretations. This, at least, leaves the reader without the material to
test whether he can accept Geertz’ interpretation as the one that (logically) follows from
a convincing process.
The idea of dialectically going back and forth between the parts and the whole to
arrive at a good or better interpretation implies a criterion of coherence: the interpreta-
tion should combine the diﬀerent elements in a comprehensible, logical or coherent
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way. This indeed seems to be a necessary condition of a good interpretation; without
coherence, an interpretation cannot be reasonably understood as a whole.4 Yet, is
coherence in itself enough? Geertz himself explicitly argues that it is not: ‘coherence
cannot be the major test of validity for a cultural description’ (1973b, 17). He argues
that the story of a swindler or the delusion of a paranoid can also be coherent. It must,
therefore, be something else that makes a coherent interpretation a good or better
interpretation. His expression of this deciding characteristic is disappointingly vague;
however, ‘A good interpretation (. . .) takes us into the heart of that of which it is an
interpretation’ (1973b, 18).
A third possibility suggested in Geertz’ essays is the idea that a good interpretation
oﬀers clariﬁcation and reduces puzzlement (1973b, 16). He oﬀers it when he asks the
very question that this paper focuses on: ‘how can you tell a better account from a
worse one?ʼ (idem). So, what does it mean ‘to reduce puzzlement’? Again, Geertz’
elaboration is disappointing. We must measure the cogency of our explications, he says,
‘against the power of the scientiﬁc imagination to bring us into touch with lives of
strangersʼ (idem).5 Reducing puzzlement might be the key to distinguishing interpreta-
tions, yet Geertz does not provide us with that key, at least not at this point.
In this section, we took a closer look at aspects of interpretative research that all
might have their value but cannot be accepted as (suﬃcient) criteria for distinguishing
between better and worse interpretations. On crucial points, moreover, Geertz in his
explanatory essays is quite vague. In particular, his elaboration of the claim that a good
interpretation means reducing puzzlement is disappointing. A closer look at what
Geertz actually does in Deep Play to present his interpretation as good can help clarify
his approach.
Comparing interpretations
Deep play’s puzzle
In the introduction of Deep Play, when Geertz tells his story about the police raid, he
also informs the reader about the elite’s understanding of cockﬁghts. The Indonesian
elite, just like the Dutch colonial government of a previous time, worried ‘about the
poor, ignorant peasant gambling all his money away, about what foreigners will think,
about the waste of time better devoted to building up the country’ (1973a, 414).
In the central part of the text, Geertz turns to the betting that always accompanies
Balinese cockﬁghts (‘an aspect I have thus far studiously ignored’ (1973a, 425). It is in
this part that Geertz is most speciﬁc: he provides an extensive and detailed presentation.
He tells us that he has observed many ﬁghts and is able to note particular regularities.
Cock owners and important clan members make bets with one another; the spectators
that stand around the spectacle also gamble with one another. The participants in the
outer circles never bet against the cock of a clan-member. In the center bets (the bets of
the cock owners and villagers of a higher ranking), large sums of money are involved.
The bets in the outer group are lower. The inner bets, moreover, always have even odds.
This is guaranteed by giving the stronger birds a disadvantage in the way the spurs are
ﬁxed. The consequence is that the outcome of the center bets is as unpredictable as
possible; at the same time, these bets are very large, and losing has substantial ﬁnancial
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consequences for the gamblers (1973a, 425–432). Such betting-behavior is incompre-
hensible if one considers the betting at cockﬁghts to be simply a game for pastime. In
fact, it is the type of gambling that Bentham called ‘deep play’. In technical utilitarian
terms, the marginal utility of such games is so low that participation is irrational. These
are games in which reasonable people would not engage. Bentham concluded that men
(‘the irrationals, the fools, the savages, the children, and so on’) should be protected
against themselves and that the government should legally ban such an activity (1973a,
432–3). This, as we saw, is exactly what the Indonesian government and the Dutch
colonial Government before it did.
Yet, despite the logical force of a utilitarian argument, the Balinese engage in such
deep play. This observation poses ‘a critical analytical problem’ for understanding
cockﬁghting, and gambling more speciﬁcally, as reasonable pastimes. From such an
interpretation, one must consider the Balinese villagers as simpleminded fools or one is
left in puzzlement.
That puzzlement is resolved, however, by the alternative interpretation that Geertz
provides: the cockﬁghts and the betting are a dramatization of status concerns. ‘(T)he
explanation lies in the fact that in such play, money is less a measure of utility (. . .) than
it is a symbol of moral import’ (1973a, 433). The high-stakes gambling is inevitable if
one really wants to bring status and honor into play. What money causes to happen is
‘the migration of the Balinese status hierarchy into the body of the cockﬁght’. The
cockﬁght is thus a simulation of the social matrix, and the money allows real prestige to
become involved in enacting it. Social positions are and at the same time are not at
stake in the cockﬁghts. No one’s status really changes through the outcomes of the
cockﬁghts, but it is, momentarily, aﬃrmed or insulted. To be sure, it is not to say that
money does not matter and that the Balinese do not care about winning or losing it. It
is only because it does matter that status really is at stake (1973a, 433, 436).
Geertz continues by pointing out how a whole range of observations (especially on
supporting your own kin group or village) ﬁt this alternative interpretation of what
cockﬁghting is all about. He concludes by citing some folktales that also support this
theory (1973a, 437–442).6
‘Three-cornered ﬁghts’
In sum, the power of Geertz’ argument for his interpretation of the practice of Balinese
cockﬁghts seems to lie in the way in which he can show that his interpretation is better
than the alternative interpretation in light of the observations. His meticulously gath-
ered data on betting during many ﬁghts (‘ﬁfty-seven matches for which I have exact and
reliable data’ 1973a, 426) do not ﬁt the interpretation that this practice is a more or less
utilitarian pastime that provides maximum pleasure at a low cost. It is a puzzling
anomaly if one does not want to see the villagers as foolish children. Yet, these
observations ﬁt the other interpretation.
He also shows that his alternative interpretation encompasses the other one. The
betting on cockﬁghts does not cease to be gambling for money, the loss of which hurts.
[As Geertz notes, there are gambling addicts in Bali. The other villagers regard them as
fools or as being sick (1973a, 443n28).] Yet, for a complete understanding of what
gambling at cockﬁghts is about, we need to see the place it has in the wider world of
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Balinese culture (1973a, 429). Further, Geertz can give support to his alternative
interpretation in reference to other types of ﬁndings, for example, the gambling
behavior of the spectators and the way in which status and playing with ﬁre is expressed
in Balinese folktales (1973a, 442).7
The way Geertz, in fact, provides support for his alternative interpretation is
remarkably similar to Lakatos’ epistemological ideal of sophisticated falsiﬁcationism
(1970). Of course, Lakatos focuses on theories as explanatory causal mechanisms,
whereas Geertz focuses on interpretations of meanings. Yet, Lakatos also emphasizes
the idea that the tests of theories are ‘three-cornered ﬁghts’ between rival theories and
observations (1970, 115). Theories should not be tested and refuted by comparing them
with observations of reality alone. The best theory is the one that (a) can include
observations that the other cannot, (b) encompasses the other (i.e. can explain the
other’s success) and (c) is conﬁrmed by other observations [in paraphrase of Lakatos
(1970, 116)]. Lakatos presented his sophisticated version as a critique to those with an
overly simplistic idea of Popper’s falsiﬁcationism. Those ‘dogmatic’ or ‘naive’ falsiﬁca-
tionists have missed important points. They act from the erroneous presupposition that
theories can be tested by confronting them with ‘bare facts’ or ‘raw data’. As Kant has
taught, observation is an active process, meaning that ‘data’ rely on observational or
background theories. Abandoning a theory, furthermore, because of one anomalous
observation is a reckless strategy that very soon leaves one without any theory at all
(Lakatos 1970, 97–99, 115, 119). For these reasons, the proper falsiﬁcationist approach
consists of the comprehensive comparison of theories based on the three points
mentioned.
In Deep Play, Geertz practices such an approach. Elsewhere, moreover, he expresses
his adherence to a scientiﬁc procedure that brings to mind Popper’s notion of ‘con-
jectures and refutations’ (Popper [1963] 2002. In his essay on thick description, he
maintains that ‘(c)ultural analysis is (or should be) guessing at meanings, assessing the
guesses, and drawing explanatory conclusions from better guesses, not discovering the
Continent of Meaning and mapping out its bodiless landscape’ (1973b, 20). Like
Popper, Geertz dismisses a search for ‘the truth’ and opts for an ongoing process of
looking for better interpretations.
Geertz might never have gathered the observations on the gambling behavior at
cockﬁghts if he had not ‘got in’. His thick description helps give us a comprehensive
idea of the actions and frame of mind of Balinese villagers, especially in relation to
cockﬁghts. It might very well be the case, furthermore, that Geertz arrived at his
interpretation by working and reworking his ﬁrst hunch in light of what he saw and
heard. Yet, the real force of his interpretation seems to lie in the fact that he can show it
to be better than the earlier one, in light of his systematic observations.
Toward better interpretations in the social sciences
In many handbooks and studies, interpretative approaches are distinguished from other
approaches. A concern for ﬁnding interpretations of meanings is presented in opposition to
being focused on explanatory theories of causal mechanisms. Each of these is often related to
particular methodologies (see, e.g. Brower, Abolaﬁa, and Carr 2000; Raadschelders 2013;
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Ricucci 2010; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 113; Yanow 2000, vii; White 1999). Often, this
dichotomy of research traditions is presented in an overview, like the one provided in Table 1.
Geertz seems to oﬀer much support for this dichotomy. As mentioned in the
Participating observation and thick description section, he explicitly links interpretative
study into the meanings of cultural phenomena to textual analyses and ﬁeld study. Our
closer analysis of his approach in Deep Play, however, told a diﬀerent story.
Interpretations are tested against observation data. The very data that Geertz presents
are of a quantitative kind, resulting from his systematic measurements during a large
number of games. In the research report that Geertz actually provides in Deep Play, he
clearly employs ‘positivist’ elements. This text thus does not support the dichotomy but
instead undermines it.
There are more reasons to question this strict dichotomy. As we saw above, in a
Popperian theory-oriented approach, ‘facts’ are understood to be always theory laden
(i.e. depending on observational or background theories). They are a result of the
active involvement of subjects in observation. According to this approach, direct
access to reality or raw data is impossible, just as the interpretationists claim. This
does not preclude the possibility, however, of testing theories and interpretations in
the light of observations. These ‘observation-data’ might be taken as thin descrip-
tions, not radically thin, that is, having no meaning or theory-perspective at all, but
thin enough to be used to compare two thickly described interpretations or theories.
Geertz uses data gathered by ‘positivist’ methods (measurement, quantitative data) to
compare diﬀerent interpretations. Similarly, there is no logical barrier to using ﬁeld-
work or case studies or qualitative data for testing causal theories (compare e.g. the
otherwise quite diﬀerently oriented testimonies of Bailey 1992; Flyvbjerg 2006; George
and Bennet 2005).
Interpretative studies into cultural meaning, often with reference to Geertz, are
supposed to put eﬀort into ‘getting in’, providing thick descriptions and performing a
type of textual analysis (see the handbooks and studies mentioned above) and with
good reason. To participate in activities and to make particular observations, gaining
trust can indeed be an inevitable condition. ‘Being in’, moreover, might be inspiring for
coming up with new interpretations. Communicating meanings, furthermore, demands
thick description as explaining the meaning of an action or practice cannot be done in
numbers or elementary signiﬁers. Yet, having succeeded in getting in and providing a
thick description are not reasons to accept an interpretation. Having followed these
guidelines is not enough. It might, in particular cases, not even be necessary for
comparing diﬀerent interpretations in light of observations.
Table 1. Conventional distinction of research traditions.
Positivist Interpretive
Knowledge ambition Theory (causal mechanism) Interpretation (meaning)
Inspiration Sciences Literary analysis
Focus Reality, facts Self-understandings, constructions
Design Large n Case studies
Methods Surveys, measuring Fieldwork, participatory observation
Data Quantitative Qualitative
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This argument does not lead to an advocacy for abandoning interpretative research
into the meanings of practices and actions. On the contrary, it shows us a way to
provide more convincing interpretations: following here the sophisticated falsiﬁcationist
epistemology.
In some studies and reﬂections in the ﬁeld of Public Administration and Political
Science, however, positions are elaborated that have some similarities with falsiﬁca-
tionism. Flyvbjerg, for example, approvingly quotes Geertz, saying that ‘The Field’
resists certain interpretations. It is a ‘powerful disciplinary force: assertive, demanding,
even coercive’ (Geertz 1995, 225 as cited in; Flyvbjerg 2001, 82. See also; Wagenaar
2011, 22). This ‘resistance of the ﬁeld’ against certain interpretations, of course, is not
the same as an intentional comparison of diﬀerent interpretation in the light of
observations in the ﬁeld.
White, another advocate of interpretive research, goes one step further. He intends to
‘correct misconceptions about the logic of inquiry in public administration and related
ﬁelds’ (White 1999, 13–14). He maintains that conjecturing interpretations is logically
equivalent to coming up with scientiﬁc hypotheses (White 1999, 101, also Ch 7 in
passim). In elaborating this claim of equivalence, he posits that ‘all theory is fundamen-
tally a matter of storytelling or narration’ (White 1999, 6). This is a claim that can be
upheld only using a very vague and uninformative understanding of storytelling.8 Yet,
amidst his concern for narratives, White notes another similarity that will sound
familiar: ‘(c)onﬂicting interpretations can be examined in light of relevant evidence
and conclusions can be drawn about the appropriateness of one interpretation over
another’ (White 1999, 134/5).
The idea of testing interpretations in the light of observations is also in another way
already present in the interpretive literature. Conducting interpretive research often is
presented and recommended as an iterative process, involving testing and revising
interpretations (See, for example, Wagenaar 2011, ch 9. Also, the Grounded Theory-
approaches, in some of its varieties, can count as an example (see Cutcliﬀe 2000). This
idea diﬀers, however, from the falsiﬁcationist one, as found in Geertz’ Deep Play. In the
latter, the rival theories are both presented and explicitly evaluated in the light of
particular observations. A study that follows the grounded theory-approach or employs
a similar iterative procedure does not oﬀer such an explicit presentation of the argu-
mentative logic for concluding that this particular interpretation is the better one. The
alternative interpretations and the particular judgments the researchers made in the
course of their observation and analysis remain implicit and cannot be retraced in
logical argument.
A more elaborate position can be found in Bevir and Rhodes. A critical review of
their interpretive study into British Governance Downing had raised methodological
doubts that are similar to the issues that were brought forward against Geertz’ approach
(see the Introduction section). Bevir and Rhodes reacted by presenting a set of criteria
to compare rival interpretations. By following these rules, the ‘intellectually honest’
researcher can avoid charges of relativism or arbitrariness and present his interpretation
as the best available. These rules encompass: take facts and criticisms that conﬂict with
an interpretation serious, use agreed facts to compare interpretations and try to present
new existing interpretations, not ones that merely block-oﬀ criticism of existing inter-
pretations (Bevir and Rhodes 2005, 184). These rules are virtually identical to the rules
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of sophisticated falsiﬁcationism. In fact, Bevir and Rhodes point to Lakatos as their
inspiration (idem: 182). What they do not do, however, is pointing out that their rules
come down to falsiﬁcationism and that, by consequence, the epistemological ideals of
interpretive and causal research are identical. After presenting the rules, Bevir and
Rhodes, remarkably, continue by claiming that ‘Positivist political scientists might reject
such an epistemology as relativist because it gives us no reason to assume the narratives
that we select as objective will correspond to truth’ (idem: 185; compare Bevir and
Rhodes 2016, 11). Here, the tables are turned in a puzzling way: falsiﬁcationism is
placed on the side of interpretive approaches by Bevir and Rhodes, while the students of
causal mechanisms said to be looking for proof and truth. The latter is hardly a position
that testers of causal theories will recognize.
Looking at theoretical reﬂections on the epistemology of interpretive research, one
can conclude that some express a position that comes (very) close to comparative
falsiﬁcationism.
Conclusions
Deep Play is an inspiring and exemplary text, although for reasons other than usually
presented. In this text, we can see Geertz practicing an interpretative approach that in
fact teaches us how to convincingly present a better interpretation of meaning. His
approach is in important respects similar to Lakatos’ sophisticated falsiﬁcationism. The
better interpretation (a) can account for observations that are anomalies from another
interpretation’s point of view, (b) can encompass the other interpretation, that is, can
explain the (partial) success of the other interpretation and (c) can provide further
conﬁrmation for phenomena that have no meaning according to the other interpreta-
tion. To perform this comparison, one must rely on systematic observation.
Geertz’ study can be understood as a least likely case to ﬁnd such a falsiﬁcationist
approach that is mostly considered to be ﬁt for explanatory theory-focused research: He
explicitly claims that investigating meaning in the social sciences demands a way of its own.
The social sciences contain, according to the ready self-interpretation of handbooks
and reﬂective studies, two distinct research approaches. These books and studies
provide a dichotomy of approaches, each with its own ontology, epistemology and
methods. This paper’s reading of the exemplary interpretive study by Geertz showed
that on the level of epistemology, the strict distinction is questionable. A study of
meaning can justify its favored interpretations in the same way as a study of explanatory
causal theories can. This falsiﬁcationist justiﬁcation, moreover, is not vulnerable to the
comments that an inductive justiﬁcation, like the one Geertz explicitly gives, has to deal
with. Designing and reading interpretive studies, like the exemplary one of Geertz, in
this way help to overcome the problems of justifying a particular interpretation as the
best one that are raised by critics. There is no need for two diﬀerent epistemologies to
the better theory and the better interpretation. Contexts of discovery might of course
diﬀer but the types of justiﬁcation can very well be the same.
Many observers have pointed out that (applied) research in the social domain suﬀers
from a separation, a gap even, between researchers using diﬀerent methods and
approaches (see e.g. Groenevelt 2015; Rhodes 2014). Potential fruitful combinations
of methods and insights are often neglected. Insight in causal mechanisms and in
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meanings that people have hardly ever are brought together. Readings that split our
ﬁeld in diﬀerent approaches all the way down might easily block the development of
fruitful combinations and inspirations. As long as approaches of others are understood
as ‘following a diﬀerent logic’, the fruitful combinations of methods and the blurring of
genres will be diﬃcult to envision.
Notes
1. In the literature, there is some discussion on Geertz’ interpretation of the meaning of
Balinese cockﬁghts [see e.g. Martin (1993, 273 ﬀ) and Smith (2011, 25)]. I will not go into
that issue here as it is of no consequence for the argument of this paper.
2. This is even more true for the alternative formulations of the meaning of cockﬁghts that
Geertz provides, such as ‘a simulation of the social matrix’, ‘a kind of sentimental education’
or ‘the enactment and re-enactment of status hierarchy’ (1973a, 436, 449, 450). These
interpretations are understandable only if one is versed in sociology and western literature
(see also Jones 1998; Warnke 2011). See on the ambiguity and complications of ‘getting in’
in Geertz’ approach also Marcus (1997).
3. Some argue that interpretive researchers need to go one step further than Geertz does: The
researcher should discuss (his) interpretations with the subjects he studied (see e.g. Beuving and
De Vries 2014; Flyvbjerg 2001; Wagenaar 2011). This is not the place to discuss dialogical or
discursive types of interpretive research. One important issue in such a discussion, however,
would also be how diﬀerent interpretations in the dialogue with subjects are to be evaluated and
how might it be determined which interpretation is better. A promising answer to these
questions is the one that Geertz actually provides in Deep Play: comparing interpretations in
the light of systematic observations (see Comparing interpretations section).
4. I will not go into the issue of whether our total cultural ﬁeld of ‘webs of meaning’ necessarily
is and can be completely coherent.
5. Compare: ‘You either grasp an interpretation or you do not, see the point of it or you do
not, accept it or you do not’ (Geertz 1973b, 24).
6. In the last part of Deep Play, Geertz presents his meta-theory of symbolic anthropology. I
will not go into this topic here.
7. At one point in the essay Thick Description, Geertz makes a claim that seems to be at odds with
what he actually does in Deep Play: “It is not against a body of uninterpreted data, radically
thinned descriptions that we must measure the cogency of our explications” (1973b, 16).
Geertz does not explain here, however, why we should not do that or why we cannot do that. It
is at this point that he claims that “our explications” should be judged “against the power of the
scientiﬁc imagination to bring us into tough with the lives of strangers” (idem, see also the
Participating observation and thick description section).
8. Compare Rohr’s review of White’s book (Rohr 2000).
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